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Despite significant advances in the disaggregation of the study of civil conflict and inter-ethnic 
violence, intra-ethnic violence remains understudied.  In this paper, we present the first 
systematic, cross-national analysis of the conditions that promote violent, fragmentary conflict 
within politically active ethnic minorities. We propose a model of intra-ethnic conflict in which 
collective violence is produced by the interaction between sub-group entrepreneurs and the 
suppressive actions of the state. This two-level model predicts a curvilinear relationship between 
the relative size of an ethnic minority and its probability of experiencing large-scale intra-ethnic 
conflict. Additional hypotheses based on the proposed causal mechanism are also posited. These 
hypotheses are tested with data drawn from a global sample of politically active ethnic 
minorities, for the period 1990 - 2006, using a combination of parametric and semi-parametric 
regression techniques.  The results strongly confirm the predicted curvilinear relationship, while 
also demonstrating that the specific shape of this relationship shifts in predictable ways under 
varying social and political contexts.   
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 In recent years political science has produced a rich literature examining the causes and 
characteristics of violence between ethnic groups (Horowitz 1985; Varshney 2001; Wilkinson 
2004).  However, a second type of conflict—the emergence of violent fragmentation within an 
ethnic group—has received comparatively little attention.  Despite the notable occurrence of co-
ethnic factional violence in several high profile conflicts, including between Hamas and Fatah in 
the Palestinian Territories and between KDP and PUK factions in Iraqi Kurdistan, very little is 
known about the general conditions under which such violent intra-ethnic struggles become more 
likely.  That is, why do some groups maintain internal peace and coherence despite enormous 
external pressures, while other groups erupt into violent internal fragmentation between warring 
factions? 
 A better understanding of these conditions would advance our understanding of conflict 
dynamics in at least three ways.  First, intra-ethnic conflict is an important phenomenon in its 
own right, generating thousands of deaths and displacements throughout the world.  Second, 
conflict within groups is intimately connected to conflict between groups.  Intra-group dynamics 
such as extremist outbidding and flanking have frequently been noted as some of the largest 
obstacles to domestic peace in divided societies (Horowitz 1985).  A complete understanding of 
ethnic conflict processes will thus be impossible without a better grasp of the forces generating 
intra-ethnic cohesion and fragmentation.  Finally, the study of intra-ethnic conflict provides a 
useful perspective on the nature of group identities, highlighting the mutable character of group 
boundaries and the need for theory which moves beyond assumptions of fixed cleavages.  
 To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to systematically examine the causes 
of intra-group violence across a global sample of both conflictual and peaceful ethnic groups. 
While a fully general account of the conditions favoring group cohesion and fragmentation is 
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beyond the scope of this paper, as a first step we develop a simple model of the cross-pressures 
acting on the production of internal violence within politically relevant ethnic minorities.  We 
focus on this subcategory of ethnic groups—who are politically mobilized but societally 
subordinated in terms of demographic weight—as we believe this category faces a common set 
of incentives and pressures that allow for productive generalizations across groups and across 
countries.  Drawing on previous models of politicized ethnic groups as instrumental providers of 
'group goods', we argue that such groups find themselves subject to cross-pressures both from 
below and from above.  From below, the group must contend with sub-group entrepreneurs who 
face strong incentives to mobilize factional violence, either to secure their own leadership 
positions or to seize a greater portion of the group's resources.  From above, the group must 
contend with state forces which face strong incentives to buy-off or suppress this factional 
violence, especially if it threatens security in the society at large.   
 We then show that this account generates the counter-intuitive prediction that a group's 
relative size will have a curvilinear relationship to its likelihood of experiencing internal 
violence.  Sub-group entrepreneurs in relatively small minority groups face an absence of 
internal opportunity for the mobilization of intra-group violence due to the suppressive actions 
of the group's leadership,  whereas sub-group entrepreneurs in relatively large minority groups 
face an absence of external opportunity for the mobilization of intra-group violence due to the 
suppressive actions of the state.  It is therefore in the middle ranges, where both of these 
pacifying forces are at their weakest, that we should expect the greatest proportion of internal 
violence to be observed. 
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  In Section 2, we review the current 
literature on civil conflict, ethnic violence, and group fragmentation.  In Section 3, we develop 
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our account of intra-ethnic violence amongst politicized minorities, and in Section 4 we derive a 
number of observable implications linking group size, demographic characteristics, and 
institutional constraints to the likelihood of intra-ethnic conflict.  We then test these hypotheses 
with data drawn from a global sample of politically active ethnic minorities, for the period 1990 - 
2006, using a combination of parametric and semi-parametric regression techniques. Finally, we 
conclude by discussing the broader implications of this account for the study of collective 
violence in hierarchical settings. 
 
II. Progress in the Study of Civil Conflict 
 In the past decade, great strides have been made in the quality of cross-national analyses 
of civil conflict.  As opposed to earlier studies which generally aggregated the units of analysis 
into pooled country-years (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Ellingsen 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003), 
the trend in recent work has been towards greater disaggregation of both the independent and 
dependent variables. Such studies have substantially deepened the quantitative analysis of civil 
conflict by replacing country-years with units of analysis defined by individual groups, center-
periphery dyads, and sub-national geographic units (e.g. Buhaug, Cederman, and Rød 2008; 
Cederman, Buhaug, and Rød 2009; Cederman and Girardin 2007; Cederman, Cunningham, 
Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009; Cederman, Girardin, and Gleditsch 2010; Cederman, Gleditsch, 
and Weidmann 2012; Fearon, Kasara, and Laitin 2007; Hegre and Raleigh 2007; Urdal 2008; 
Weidmann 2009; Wimmer, Cederman, and Min 2009; Wimmer and Min 2009; Asal, Brown, and 
Dalton 2012; Fjelde and Nilsson 2012; Staniland 2012).  However, while this literature has 
greatly expanded our understanding of the micro-level processes that underlie the emergence of 
civil conflict, the project of disaggregation is not yet complete, as analysis of intra-ethnic 
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 This stands in stark contrast to the qualitative literature on civil conflict, which has long 
recognized that intra-ethnic dynamics are a critical component of the processes that generate 
broader forms of collective violence.  As Jinadu (2004) notes: 
ethnic groups are oftentimes polarized among themselves, over, for example, strategies to 
pursue in competitive situations with other ethnic groups, over leadership succession, all 
leading to fractures and, in many cases, the emergence of sub-ethnic or even newly 
constructed ethnic groups within them. We, therefore, need to study intra-ethnic conflict, 
as a micro-level of analysis within the larger kaleidoscope of inter-ethnic relations and 
conflicts. (8) 
 
This literature has developed several key insights into the nature of ethnic groups and the 
conflicts they experience.  First, ethnic groups are generally not internally homogeneous, and 
cannot be expected to have uniformly distributed political preferences (see Kalyvas 2003).  As 
Akinteye (1999) shows in his study of the Igbo-Ora in Nigeria, groups are frequently beset by 
cross-cutting political and economic cleavages that can form the basis for the mobilization of 
collective violence at the sub-group level.  Such internal cleavages may be based on more narrow 
ethnic markers, but they may also be rooted in clan or tribe-based loyalties that do not map 
neatly onto ethnic boundaries, as Riphenburg (2005) discusses in the context of tribal politics in 
Afghanistan.  Moreover, the salience of sub-group cleavages can be manipulated by 
opportunistic political entrepreneurs even in the absence of any overt pre-existing tensions (see 
Fearon and Laitin 2000).  As a result of these factors, there can be a great deal of internal 




 The second key insight to draw from this literature is that ethnic groups are not static.  
Rather, the boundaries of ethnic group membership are the subject of constant contestation in 
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which political entrepreneurs struggle to define membership in terms that will be favorable to 
their interests.  The salience and composition of ethnic identity categories can therefore be 
expected to change substantially over time (Barth 1969; Anderson 1991; Brass 1997).  As 
Kalyvas (2008) argues, the occurrence of  “multi-directional identity transformations, as opposed 
to just consolidation, is more widespread than commonly assumed" (1045).  He finds evidence of 
'ethnic defection'—whereby members of an insurgent ethnic minority join forces with the 
dominant state—in the Algerian War of Independence, the Mau Mau insurgency in Kenya, the 
Greek Civil War, and recent conflicts in Lebanon, East Timor, India, Chechnya, and Iraq (1053-
1055; see also Staniland 2012).  Such work has also shown that fears of such defection, and the 
need to shore up crumbling loyalties, can help explain the brutality of the massacres that rebels 
become willing to inflict on their ethnic brethren (Kalyvas 2001).  
 These examples demonstrate that intra-ethnic conflicts are frequently nested in broader 
political struggles vis-a-vis the state.  Faced with the pressure to compete for scarce social, 
political, and economic resources, intra-group divisions can become hardened and polarized.  In 
the resulting context of mistrust and suspicion there can be strong incentives for political 
entrepreneurs to engage in 'flanking' behaviors, in which they attempt to maximize their base of 
support by adopting ever more extreme postures regarding the group's boundaries and their 
willingness to resort to violence to defend the group's "true" members (see Horowitz 1985; Lake 
and Rothchild 1996; Hislope 1997; Caspersen 2008).  These dynamics can generate a spiral of 
intra-group collective violence—ranging from urban riots to outright intercommunal warfare—
along newly hardened sub-group lines.  Of course, this outcome is far from inevitable.  Many 
ethnic groups face severe economic and political pressures while remaining internally peaceful.  
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The key question, then, is whether we can develop an understanding of the conditions under 
which episodes of violent internal fragmentation become more likely to occur. 
 
III. A Two-Level Theory of Group Fragmentation 
 In contrast to accounts which claim that ethnic groups persist naturally due to the 
immaleability of the markers used to define their boundaries (Connor 1994; Geertz 1973; Smith 
1986; Shils 1995), we characterize ethnic groups as instrumental providers of "joint goods" 
(Hechter 1987) or "group goods" (Hardin 1995; Lichbach 1995), whose boundaries are subject to 
frequent internal contestation.  Seen from this perspective, ethnic groups function primarily as 
sociopolitical coalitions that pool members' resources, both to provide goods directly to their 
group and to extract further benefits from the state on their group's behalf (Bates 1983; Chandra 
2004).  These benefits can range from the direct transfer of resources, such as infrastructure, 
policing, or social services, to policies that grant the group autonomy in particular cultural or 
political domains.  Such benefits are defined as 'group goods' because they generally can only be 
enjoyed by the members of the group (i.e. they are jointly excludable) and because their 
enjoyment by one member does not reduce their enjoyment by other members (i.e. they are 
jointly supplied).   Ethnic groups, then, are like "clubs" (Laitin and Berman 2008) that demand 
sacrifices from their members in exchange for desired goods that are not forthcoming from the 
state and cannot be obtained on an individual basis (Hechter 1987, 177).
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However, the fact that group goods are jointly provided does not mean that they will 
come to be evenly distributed amongst the group's members.  While an idealized 'group good' 
would be characterized by perfectly non-rival consumption, and hence would necessarily be 
equally available to all group members, more recent formal work has recognized that most of the 
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goods pursued by collective actors represent a mixture of rival and non-rival consumption 
(Esteban and Ray 2001).  As a result, various forms of intra-group heterogeneity—geographic, 
demographic, economic, etc.—will tend to generate noticeable differences in how group goods 
are distributed internally (Azam 2001).  Such differences create opportunities for subgroup 
entrepreneurs to challenge extant arrangements by claiming that group boundaries should be 
constituted along alternative lines.  By doing so, sub-group entrepreneurs can act to secure their 
own leadership positions, weaken the influence of their opponents, and alter the internal 
allocation of group resources.
4
  For instance, when the inequality of social service provision 
fueled rising dissatisfaction with the Palestinian Authority in Gaza, this created space for the 
emergent Hamas movement to advance an alternative definition of group boundaries rooted in 
extreme religious piety, as a contrast to the secularism of Fatah in the West Bank (Brynen 1995; 
Laitin and Berman 2008; MAR 2009).  
While most existing models of ethnic politics have simply assumed away the problem of 
intra-group dynamics,
5
 some recent formal work has begun to explicitly tackle the difficulties 
associated with overcoming intra-group divisions in the production of group goods (Garfinkel 
2004; Munster 2007).  The central message of this work is that distributional problems are 
frequently the driving force behind both conflict between groups and conflict within groups (see 
Azam 2001).  We adopt this view here, and argue that the observation of collective internal 
violence is generally the result of distributional conflict between emergent intra-group factions, 
mobilized by sub-group entrepreneurs on the basis of politically activated aspects of intra-group 
heterogeneity.  Although frequently concealed in convenient rhetoric by sub-group entrepreneurs 
seeking to drape their machinations in an aura of collective legitimacy, the forces underlying 
such conflict are fundamentally rooted in the pursuit of resources and power. 
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In the case of Fatah and Hamas, a pre-existing geographic divide also provided fodder for 
political entrepreneurs seeking to promote a novel sub-group cleavage on the basis of religious 
fundamentalism (MAR 2009).  However, it is important to recognize that sub-group 
entrepreneurs can manipulate the salience of sub-group cleavages even in the absence of any 
overt pre-existing tensions (see Fearon and Laitin 2000).  Lin, Wu, and Lee (2006) find evidence 
of this phenomenon in Taiwan, where the majority Han-Chinese ethnicity has been divided into 
Minnanese, Hakka, and Mainlanders by politicians seeking to "mobilize electoral support in 
subethnic terms" (37).  In a similar vein, Banjo (1998) argues that intra-ethnic violence amongst 
the Ogoni of Nigeria was precipitated as competing factions mobilized along novel lines in an 
attempt to restrict access to newly discovered oil wealth.  It is the potential for such rewards 
which creates an incentive for sub-group political entrepreneurs to heighten the salience of 
internal cleavages, even where none were previously apparent.   
Among the tactics that sub-group entrepreneurs can utilize in their attempts to solidify an 
emergent division, none are more potent than the production of collective violence.  By 
convincing followers to collectively attack co-ethnics on the basis of an internal cleavage, the 
entrepreneur ensures that the new line will be viewed as socially and politically relevant by 
members on both sides, while also ensuring feelings of antagonism between the emergent sub-
groups.  In the resulting context of mistrust and suspicion there are strong incentives for rival 
entrepreneurs to engage in escalating reprisal attacks, polarizing the group into opposing camps 
and generating a spiral of collective violence along newly hardened sub-group lines (Hislope 
1997; Caspersen 2008).  Seen from this perspective, intra-ethnic violence is simply a tool 




 If we wish to fully understand the conditions under which collective violence will be 
observed within groups, however, we must expand our focus beyond the internal dynamics of 
sub-group factionalism.  Kalyvas (2003, 475) reminds us that, “it is the convergence of local 
motives and supralocal imperatives" which renders civil conflict such a complex phenomenon.  
As Wilkinson (2004) shows in the context of ethnic riots in India, collective violence is not 
produced in a vacuum, but rather through strategic interactions between ethnic extremists and the 
forces of the state.  In general, the state's most basic interest lies in the preservation of domestic 
order and (at least the appearance of) a monopoly on the large-scale deployment of armed force 
(Weber 1964; Krasner 1999).  We should therefore expect state influence to be employed in the 
suppression of collective violence, especially if that violence could be of a sufficient scale to call 
into question the state's capacity to provide security for its citizens.
6
  This suppression can take 
several forms.  The state may impose order through overt physical force, it may covertly 
sabotage violent factions from within, or it may find ways to make side payments to buy off 
opponents (Davenport 2007a).  Regardless of the specific tactics employed, the key point is that 
state efforts can exercise powerful influence over the ability of sub-group entrepreneurs to 
mobilize collective violence in the pursuit of their political aims.  As a result, intra-group 
distributional bargaining, and the conflicts that sometimes arise from it, necessarily takes place 
in the shadow of state power. 
 This is particularly true for politically relevant ethnic minorities—groups that are 
politically mobilized along ethnic lines, but disadvantaged in terms of demographic weight—
which necessarily find themselves in subordinate positions vis-a-vis the state.  Such groups are 
neither so quiescent as to pass beneath the state's notice, nor so strong as to be able to ignore the 
state's influence.  This is precisely why they represent such a convenient target for empirical 
11 
 
analysis, as they are subject to a common set of internal pressures and external constraints that 
allow us to make cross-national generalizations about their behavior. We turn now to the 
derivation of those hypotheses. 
 
IV. Group Size and the Production of Internal Violence 
 The account presented above argues that internal collective violence amongst politically 
active ethnic minorities is produced at the intersection of the mobilizational efforts of political 
entrepreneurs operating at the sub-group level and the suppressive efforts of state forces 
operating at the supra-group level.  The key difficulty faced in testing this account lies in the fact 
that the actions of the critical players are frequently unobservable.  Attempts by sub-group 
entrepreneurs to mobilize factional violence will generally only be observable if and when they 
produce collective violence, and the fragmentation may occur along lines that previously 
appeared irrelevant to the group's politics.  Moreover, the suppressive actions of the state will 
frequently be covert in nature, either to limit the reaction to violent repression or to avoid the 
political inconvenience of generating visible side payments to subordinate ethnic minorities. 
Thus, while we have strong reasons to suspect that both internal pressures and external 
constraints are acting on the propensity of groups to experience internal violence, in testing this 
conjecture we cannot rely on direct observation of the micro-level dynamics.  Instead, our 
empirical strategy rests on deriving a number of testable implications concerning macro-level 
relationships that should be observed if our theory is correct. 
 The most basic of these relationships concerns r, the relative size of the group.  Much 
previous work has recognized that the demographic weight of a group, relative to the country as 
a whole, is a key indicator of societal power and an important determinant of conflict behavior 
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(Bhavnani and Miodownik 2009, Buhaug, Cederman, and Rød 2008, Cederman, Buhaug, and 
Rød 2009, Esteban and Ray 2008, Forsberg 2008, Reynal-Querol 2002, and Reynal-Querol and 
Montalvo 2005).  In analyzing intra-ethnic conflict, relative group size provides a particularly 
useful lens through which to examine the likelihood of violence, as variations in relative group 
size can be expected to generate quite different effects on the incentives operating at the sub-
group and supra-group levels. 
 Consider first the incentives operating at the sub-group level.  We can assume that in any 
group of sufficient size, there will be potential sub-group entrepreneurs who would like to see the 
group organized along alternative lines.  What varies between groups is not the presence of such 
actors, but the incentives and constraints they face in pursuing their interests.  Theorists of 
collective action have recognized for some time that internal cohesion becomes more difficult to 
maintain as group size increases (Olson 1965; Black 1974; Lichbach 1995), an insight confirmed 
by classic experimental results on cooperation in n-person prisoner's dilemmas (Bonacich et al. 
1976; Fox and Guyer 1977; Hamburger, Guyer, and Fox 1975).  There are a number of reasons 
for this relationship.  As group size increases, so too does the internal heterogeneity of the 
group's sociopolitical preferences (Alesina and Spolare 2003), multiplying the number of cross-
cutting cleavages along which sub-group entrepreneurs can seek to mobilize factional violence.  
Moreover, we can expect that larger groups will contain a higher number of viable sub-groups, 
thus increasing the difficulty of managing distributional conflicts between them.  In addition, 
Rohner (2007) shows that intra-group tensions will increase with group size due to the decreased 
reputational costs of defection.  Thus, as shown in Figure 1, we should expect the internal 
(centrifugal) pressures promoting the production of intra-ethnic fragmentation, F, to be an 
increasing function of the group's relative size, r.  We should also expect that this relationship 
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will be somewhat attenuated as r → 0.5, as larger minorities are generally more successful at 
extracting resources from the state (DeNardo 1985; Estaban and Ray 2001), and group leaders 
are likely to invest a portion of those increased returns in efforts to foster greater internal 
cohesion.  Hence, if we considered only the incentives operating at the sub-group level, we 
would expect a monotonically positive, concave relationship between a group's relative size, r, 
and it's likelihood of experiencing internal collective violence (see Figure 1).    
 However, this picture changes dramatically when we consider the incentives facing the 
state.  As we argued above, the state's most basic interest lies in the preservation of domestic 
peace and stability.  Large-scale collective violence threatens perceptions of domestic security, 
creating a strong incentive for states to buy-off or suppress factional conflicts before they 
become visible.  Of course, all states face limitations in the resources they can devote to such 
efforts.  Given the impossibility of suppressing all potential conflicts, states are forced to decide 
which threats are most dire.
7
  All else being equal, we should therefore expect that efforts to buy-
off or suppress conflict will be directed more towards larger groups than towards smaller groups, 
as these are the groups whose violence poses the greatest threat to perceptions of general 
stability.
8
  Thus, looking again to Figure 1, we should expect the external (centripetal) pressures 
promoting the suppression of intra-ethnic fragmentation, S, to be an increasing function of the 
group's relative size, r.  In contrast, however, to the centrifugal pressures operating at the sub-
group level, this centripetal relationship should experience none of the same attenuation as          
r → 0.5.  If anything, the relationship should strengthen as r → 0.5, as each step closer to 
societal parity implies not only a further increase in the potential scale of violence within the 
group in question, but also a corresponding decrease in the probability that there exist any 
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additional groups of equal or greater size in the same country that could split the allocation of 
state suppressive efforts.   
 In summary, we expect the internal pressures promoting the production of intra-group 
fragmentation to be an increasing function of r, such that F'(r) > 0, F''(r) < 0, and F(0) = 0 for  
0 ≤ r ≤ 0.5; and we expect the external pressures promoting the suppression of intra-group 
fragmentation to be an increasing function of r, such that S'(r) > 0, S''(r) ≥ 0, and S(0) = 0 for  
0 ≤ r ≤ 0.5.9  Let us suppose further that the probability of intra-group violence is proportional to 
the difference in strength, D, between these two opposing pressures: 
                         
Then, as long as F'(0) > S'(0), the logic of Figure 1 makes clear that there must be a unique 
value, r*, at which the probability of internal violence is maximized.
10
   
 Taken together, these two levels of analysis thus allow us to generate the counter-
intuitive prediction that the likelihood of internal collective violence amongst politically active 
ethnic minorities is not a simple positive function of relative group size, r, but rather a concave 
curvilinear function of r.  Relatively small minority groups face little distributional 
heterogeneity, and thus offer little opportunity for sub-group entrepreneurs to promote factional 
violence.  At the other extreme, relatively large minority groups are more likely to have their 
internal conflicts suppressed by the state before they become visible to outside observers.   In 
other words, sub-group entrepreneurs in relatively small groups face an absence of internal 
opportunity for the mobilization of intra-group violence, whereas sub-group entrepreneurs in 
relatively large groups face an absence of external opportunity for the mobilization of intra-
group violence.  It is therefore in the middle ranges, where both of these pacifying forces are at 
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their weakest, that we should expect the greatest proportion of internal violence to be observed 
(see Figure 1).  Hence, we have our first observable implication: 
 
 H1: Amongst politically active ethnic minorities, the likelihood of internal violence has a 
 curvilinear relationship to relative group size, with minima at r = 0.0 and r = 0.5, and a 
 maximum at r*. 
 
 The logic of internal and external cross-pressures depicted in Figure 1 also allows us to 
generate additional predictions concerning variation in the relationship between group size and 
internal conflict in different social and political contexts.  Considering first the supra-group level 
of analysis, it is important to note that states differ greatly in the freedom with which they can 
devote resources to the violent or non-violent suppression of factional violence.  In fully 
consolidated democracies, the combination of competitive elections and institutional constraints 
on executive actions can greatly increase the difficulty of buying-off factions through side 
payments or repressing their activities through force.  Indeed, the literature on state repression 
consistently finds that democracies are less likely to use repression when faced with domestic 
unrest (Davenport 2004, 2007b; Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 
2005).  In the language of our model, this reduction in the provision of suppressive force by the 
state amounts to a downward shift in the S curve, such as the shift from S0 to SDem shown in 
Figure 2.  While this shift clearly predicts an increase in the aggregate probability of intra-ethnic 
violence, Figure 2 makes clear that such a shift also generates the counter-intuitive prediction 
that democratic institutions should generate higher values of r*.  In other words, because they 
inhibit the application of suppressive force by the state, democratic constraints on executive 
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action should be expected to raise the relative size at which intra-group violence is optimally 
produced.  Hence, we have our second hypothesis: 
 
 H2: In states with strong democratic constraints on executive action,  
  (a) the probability of intra-ethnic violence will be higher, and 
  (b) the value of r* will be higher.   
  
 Shifting to the sub-group level of analysis, it seems clear that we should also expect that 
ethnic groups would differ in their levels of cohesion and solidarity.  While ethnic boundaries are 
always subject to contestation, groups whose boundaries are characterized by descent-based 
markers of ethnic distinction seem likely to present higher barriers to the machinations of sub-
group entrepreneurs.  Members of groups distinguished from the broader society by the uniform 
presence of racial, religious, or linguistic markers, may experience stronger ties of ethnic 
affinity, both because they provide a conveniently homogenous target for political entrepreneurs 
seeking to emphasize group unity (Geertz 1973), and because decreased opportunities for exit 
tend to increase the loyalties that members feel towards their group (Hirschman 1970).  In the 
language of our model, this reduction in the ease with which sub-group entrepreneurs can foment 
internal fragmentation amounts to a downward shift in the F curve, such as the shift from F0 to 
FEth shown in Figure 2.  While such a shift clearly predicts an decrease in the aggregate 
probability of intra-ethnic violence, it also predicts a decrease in the value of r*.  That is, because 
stronger ethnic bonds inhibit the success of divisive mobilizational appeals, they also lower the 




 H3: In groups with high levels of ethnic cohesion,  
  (a) the probability of intra-ethnic violence will be lower, and 
  (b) the value of r* will be lower.   
 
V. Data and Methods 
 In order to test these hypotheses, we require measures of both relative group size and 
internal violence across ethnic groups.  Among the datasets currently available to the discipline, 
the Minorities at Risk (MAR) Project (2009) stands alone in offering measures of both of these 
factors across a global sample of politically mobilized ethnic groups, and therefore represents the 
ideal starting point for our analysis.  However, this data source also carries important limitations 
that must be addressed before we can proceed.  Rather than attempting to capture the full 
universe of ethnic groups worldwide, MAR imposes several key selection criteria that govern 
which groups are recorded.  In brief, these criteria require that the ethnic groups be (1) politically 
relevant, in the sense that they formulate demands vis-a-vis the state, (2) demographic minorities, 
and (3) subject to social or political discrimination.  The first two criteria pose no difficulties, as 
they simply describe the domain to which our theory is intended to apply: politically relevant 
ethnic minorities.  The third criterion, though, is more problematic.  At first glance, it's quite 
possible that this selection rule is correlated with group size.  If, for instance, smaller minority 
groups are more likely to face discrimination and thus more likely to be included in the MAR 
sample, this could severely bias our inferences regarding the relationship between minority 
group size and internal conflict. 
 To ensure against this possibility, we draw information from the Ethnic Power Relations 
(EPR) dataset (Cederman, Min, and Wimmer 2010), which utilizes expert surveys to identify all 
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politically relevant ethnic groups in the world, regardless of their status or power.  While EPR 
does not record instances of intra-ethnic conflict, it does record each group's relative size — that 
is, the group's population divided by the total population of the country in which they reside.  
This means that we can use the EPR group list to construct a baseline distribution of minority 
group sizes against which to compare the MAR sample for potential bias.  In 2005 (the most 
recent year available in both datasets), the  EPR data identify 554 politically relevant ethnic 
minorities in 126 countries.  In contrast, from the MAR data we identify only 276 disadvantaged 
ethnic minorities in 115 countries.  However, while this makes clear that MAR represents only a 
subsample of the full universe of ethnic groups, we find that the distributions of group sizes in 
the two samples are nearly identical (EPR: μ = 0.095, σ = 0.113; MAR: μ = 0.100, σ = 0.108).  
Moreover, a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of distributional equivalence fails to reject the null 
hypothesis that the two samples of groups sizes were drawn from equivalent underlying 
distributions (D = 0.0767, p = 0.248).  We thus conclude that "disadvantaged" ethnic minorities 
represent a subsample of "politically relevant" ethnic minorities drawn as-if at random with 
regard to group size, and that the MAR selection procedure is therefore unlikely to bias the 
results reported below.  Hence our key independent variable, Relative Group Size, is set equal to 
the group's population divided by the total population of the country in which they reside, as 
recorded in the MAR dataset.  Because our theory predicts a curvilinear relationship between 
relative group size and the likelihood of internal collective violence, all models also include a 
squared version of this variable.   
 Our dependent variable, Fracture, is measured dichotomously on a group-year basis and 
equals 1 for any group-year in which we observe internal collective violence, as recorded in the 
MAR dataset over the period 1990 - 2006.  We define internal collective violence as events in 
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which: (1) competing factions are explicitly organized along intra-group lines, (2) those factions 
pursue their aims through violence directed at group members, and (3) the violence is mobilized 
collectively in the form of large-scale riots or armed clashes.  By requiring that the violence be 
organized and collective, this definition purposely excludes small-scale attacks perpetrated by 
lone individuals, as we are interested in the dynamics of collective fragmentation rather than the 
isolated acts of a few disaffected outcasts (see Appendix A for details).  In the 17-year period 
examined here, 53 of the groups in our sample experienced at least one episode of internal 
collective violence. 
 To test Hypothesis 2, we also require a measure of the strength of democratic institutional 
constraints.  The standard approach in the civil conflict literature seeks to capture the effects of 
democracy using a 21-point democracy-autocracy scale derived from the Polity IV dataset, 
which combines measures of the strength of executive constraints, the competiveness of 
executive selection, and the degree of popular political participation (Marshall and Jaggers 
2009).  However, Vreeland (2008) notes that the participation component of the Polity index is 
measured, in part, on the basis of whether civil violence has been observed in a given country.  
The standard Polity index may therefore generate spurious inferences regarding the relationship 
between democracy and civil conflict.  Instead, we utilize the alternative XPolity index 
developed by Vreeland (2008), which simply removes the problematic participation component 
from the estimation of the democracy-autocracy scale.  This yields an index, ranging from -6 to 
7, which captures more precisely the specific causal factor referenced in our second hypothesis: 




 To capture the effects of ethnic cohesion referenced in Hypothesis 3, we code  three 
dichotomous measures of the ethnic markers used to define group membership.  In order to 
qualify, such traits must be markers of ethnic distinction.  That is, they must be passed down 
primarily through kin relations, they must be nearly ubiquitous amongst members of the group, 
and they must be generally absent from the broader population.  Drawing on information from 
the MAR dataset, we set  Race equal to 1 if the group is characterized by a distinct physical 
appearance, Religion equal to 1 if the group is characterized by distinct religious beliefs, and 
Language equal to 1 if the group is characterized by the use of a distinct language (see Appendix 
A for details). 
 We also derive a number of control variables from the MAR dataset, intended to measure 
factors which, while not directly captured by our theory, may nevertheless be correlated with 
both group size and factional conflict and could therefore bias our main results if they were 
omitted from the analysis (see Appendix A for details).  First, we note that though our theory 
assumed that states will generally devote their efforts to the suppression of factional conflict, this 
is certainly not always the case.  In particular, when facing an armed insurrection by a specific 
ethnic group, states may instead devote their efforts to the promotion of factional splits within 
that group, as internal conflicts are likely to weaken the effectiveness with which the group can 
challenge state forces.  Indeed, both Kalyvas (2008) and Lyall (2010) find that states can be quite 
strategic in promoting intra-group divisions when challenged by ethnic rebellions.
11
  We 
therefore control for Rebellion, which equals 1 if the group was involved in collective violence 
against state forces in the previous five years. 
 Second, we note that while our theory focused exclusively on within-country dynamics, 
many ethnic groups also have close kin across an international border.  Such groups can be 
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expected to face heightened distributional tensions, as members from either side are likely to 
differ in their sociopolitical preferences, economic needs, and cultural practices (Posner 2004).  
The inevitable movement of kin across the border will therefore tend to generate imbalances in 
the degree to which group members are satisfied with the status quo that will be difficult to 
eliminate as long as the interstate border forces members into separate political regimes.  This 
mechanism is highlighted by Chan (2004), Downman (2004), and Kim (2006), who each 
examine how the pressures of immigration can generate distributional tensions and factional 
conflict within ethnic groups.  Thus, we include Transnational Dispersion as a control variable, 
setting it equal to 1 for groups that have close kin in a separate country that borders their own. 
 Third, we note that ethnic groups differ substantially in the kinds of organizations used to 
defend their interests vis-a-vis the state and the broader society.  Groups whose interests are 
represented exclusively by lawfully organized political parties or social movements may find it 
easier to avoid internal factional violence, both because such organizations should make it easier 
for the group to settle internal distributional disputes peacefully, and because such organizations 
should facilitate the monitoring and suppression of factional conflict by the state.  In contrast, 
groups with militant armed wings should face lower barriers to internal conflict, and higher 
barriers to state suppression.  Hence, Militant Organization is set equal to 1 for any group which 
includes organizations that promote joint political action through violent means.  Finally, 
because states differ in their capacities to monitor the activities of their citizens and exert 
coercive force over their behaviors, we also control for GDP per capita and the Total Population 
of the country (logged), as these have been found to be key indicators of state capacity and state 
reach (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Sambanis 2006).  
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 The main models are each estimated using logistic regression, with Huber/White robust 
standard errors adjusted for clustering by country.  As a check against the potential bias produced 
by duration dependence each of these models also includes Peace Years, which measures the 
number of years since the last Fracture event in a particular group, along with a natural cubic 
spline of Peace Years, as per the recommendations of Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998).
12
  In 




 Because the central observable implication derived from our account concerns the 
curvilinear shape of the relationship between Relative Group Size and Fracture, we also 
conducted additional robustness checks in which we relaxed the functional form assumptions of 
the parametric specification.  This was necessary due the well-known difficulties associated with 
quadratic interaction terms, which can force a relationship to appear U-shaped even when the 
true data generating process does not have a quadratic form.  To assess this possibility, we utilize 
thin plate regression splines, a variety of semi-parametric regression which is flexible with 
respect to the non-linear shape of the response function (Wood 2006).  This approach allows the 
data to inductively inform the shape of the relationship between our variables of interest, 
allowing more precise estimation of the shape of the relationship between Relative Group Size 
and Fracture, unconstrained by the quadratic parametric form.
14
  To optimize the selection of the 
smoothing parameter λ that governs the tradeoff between maximizing the fit and maximizing the 
parsimony of the resulting functional form, we utilize an approach known as generalized cross-
validation (GCV), which seeks to minimize prediction errors while penalizing over-fitting 







 The results from the logistic regressions are reported in Table 1.  Model 1 is a baseline 
specification, which includes only the effects of Relative Group Size and the Peace Years 
variables.  Model 2 adds the variables measured at the group level: Race, Religion, Language, 
Rebellion, Transnational Dispersion, and Militant Organization.  Finally, Model 3 adds the 
variables measured at the state level: XPolity, GDP per capita, and Total Population. All three 
models demonstrate strong confirmation of Hypothesis 1.  Regardless of which control variables 
are included in the specification, the statistically significant coefficients for Relative Group Size 
(p < 0.001) and Relative Group Size
2
 (p = 0.003) show that that the likelihood of internal 
collective violence has a curvilinear relationship to the relative size of an ethnic minority, as 
predicted by our two-level theory of group fragmentation.  This relationship can be more easily 
visualized by plotting the predicted likelihood of internal collective violence as a function of 
relative group size (see Figure 3).  As the plot shows, the likelihood of fragmentation is lowest 
both for the smallest groups and the largest groups, and reaches its peak in the middle ranges.  
This analysis also allows us to estimate the value of r*, the point at which the sum of the 
pacifying forces stemming from the absence of internal opportunity at the sub-group level and 
the absence of external opportunity at the supra-group level are at their weakest.  The results 
indicate that the most violence-prone configuration occurs when a group comprises 
approximately 25% of the total country population. 
 The evidence in Table 1 also provides strong confirmation of Hypothesis 2a.  The 
coefficient for XPolity is positive and statistically significant (p = 0.022), lending credence to the 
argument that while states generally have strong incentives to suppress factional violence, they 
can be constrained in their freedom to do so by strong democratic institutions.  The results also 
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provide partial confirmation of Hypothesis 3a.  Though the coefficients for Race and Religion 
are quite far from statistical significance, Language has a statistically significant (p = 0.004) 
negative effect in all specifications.  Hence, while minorities marked by racial and religious 
boundaries apparently exhibit no additional capacities for maintaining group unity, the presence 
of a shared and distinct language dramatically improves the likelihood that factional violence 
will be avoided.    This finding seems to echo the expectations of many of the classical theorists 
of nationalism such as Anderson (1991), Gellner (1983), and Deutsch (1953) who argued that 
communities are rendered more cohesive when members can communicate more effectively with 
each other than they can with outsiders.  
 The control variables generally behave as expected.  The positive and significant 
coefficient for Rebellion indicates that states do not suppress factional violence uniformly, but 
rather behave quite strategically in this regard, becoming more likely to allow or promote intra-
ethnic violence rather than suppressing it when faced with an insurrection by a disadvantaged 
ethnic minority.  The coefficients for Transnational Dispersion and Militant Organization are 
both statistically significant and positive, indicating that groups that straddle an international 
border and groups that include an armed militant wing are more likely to face internal collective 
violence.   
 The results from the semi-parametric spline regressions are also strongly supportive of 
Hypothesis 1 (see Table 2).  The functional form estimated through the GCV procedure, which 
also includes a separate cubic spline for the effect of Peace Years, yields a highly significant 
effect for Relative Group Size (p < 0.0001).
16
   As shown in Figure 3, the predicted probabilities 
drawn from the semi-parametric model conform very closely with the inferences drawn from the 
parametric model, again demonstrating that the likelihood of conflict peaks for groups which 
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comprise approximately 25% of the total country population.  Moreover, the model shows that 
the effects of Relative Group Size are highly significant, not only in statistical terms, but also in 
substantive terms.  Holding all else constant, shifting from r = 0.01 to r = 0.25 nearly triples the 
likelihood of observing internal collective violence.  This is strong evidence that the curvilinear 
relationship estimated between Relative Group Size and Fracture is not a mere artifact of the 
functional form assumptions imposed by the quadratic interaction term, but rather is a real 
property of the data in our sample.  Indeed, given the flexibility of the spline regression model, it 
is notable that such a simple functional form was selected.  The model estimates the effective 
degrees of freedom in the relationship to be 1.923, which indicates that the function requires only 
a small number of "knots" (changes in the direction of the curve) to account for the observed 
patterns. 
 The spline regressions also provide the ideal means of testing our secondary hypotheses, 
H2b and H3b.  Recall that our model predicts that r*, the relative group size at which internal 
violence is optimally produced, will vary across different social and political contexts.  In 
particular, we expect r* to be higher when state suppressive activities are inhibited, and we 
expect r* to be lower in groups with greater levels of internal cohesion.  To test these 
conjectures, we estimate spline regressions on separate subsamples of our data, allowing us to 
estimate changes in r* at a far greater level of precision than would be possible with purely 
parametric approaches that enforce a quadratic functional form.  For the first conjecture (H2b), 
we draw the subsample from upper end of the XPolity distribution (i.e. observations for which 
XPolity > 5), and for the second conjecture (H3b) we draw the subsample of linguistically 
distinct groups (i.e. observations for which Language = 1).   
26 
 
 As reported in Table 2, the smooths of Relative Group Size remain statistically significant 
across each of the subsamples.  However, the specific shapes estimated by the spline function 
vary greatly across these conditions.  The relationships can be more readily visualized by 
plotting the predicted probability of internal violence as a function of Relative Group Size for 
each subsample, as shown in Figure 4.   As predicted by our theory, the plot shows that the 
optimal production of internal violence occurs at much lower group sizes within the Language 
subsample, and occurs at much higher group sizes within the Democracy subsample.  Whereas 
this optimum point was estimated at r* = 0.25 for the full sample, within the Language 
subsample we estimate r* = 0.11 and within the Democracy subsample we estimate r* = 0.38.  
This represents additional evidence that the specific mechanism we postulated — the two-level 
tradeoff between internal pressures of fragmentation and external pressures of suppression — is 
actually driving the curvilinear relationship between Relative Group Size and the likelihood of 
internal collective violence that we observe in the data.  
 
Conclusion 
 Taken as a whole, the evidence presented here lends substantial credence to our two-level 
model of group fragmentation, demonstrating that internal collective violence is produced 
through the efforts of sub-group entrepreneurs seeking leverage in intra-group distributional 
conflicts, while also demonstrating that such intra-group battles necessarily occur in the shadow 
of state power.  This account allowed us to generate the counter-intuitive prediction that the 
likelihood of internal collective violence is a curvilinear function of relative group size, while 
also successfully predicting how the specific shape of that relationship should change under 
varying sociopolitical contexts that alter the relative strengths of the internal and external 
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pressures operating on the production of internal collective violence.  The results thus clearly 
demonstrate the benefits that can be achieved by deriving predictions of conflict behavior from 
models that simultaneously incorporate forces operating at multiple levels of analysis.   
 Moreover, while we have focused on the category of politically relevant ethnic minorities 
as a convenient target for empirical analysis, the implications of our account reach far beyond 
this class of groups.  Our model is premised on the observation that such groups find themselves 
operating at the intersection of cross-pressures emanating from both the sub-group and supra-
group levels.  While this is certainly true of disadvantaged ethnic minorities, it is also true of any 
number of politically mobilized groups operating in the context of villages, states, or even firms.  
More generally, we might say that the patterns identified here are characteristic of conflict in 
nested hierarchies, in which key actors are operating at both lower and higher levels of 
aggregation.  The results presented above are thus only a starting point.  If our account is correct, 
we may find similar empirical patterns in other conflict settings characterized by nested 
hierarchies of power relations.  However, a more complete investigation of this possibility will 






Table 1.  Logistic Regressions: Internal Collective Violence 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3












Transnational Dispersion 1.0741*** 0.8854***
(0.3435) (0.2952)










Peace Years -1.2772*** -1.2712*** -1.1159***
(0.1759) (0.1637) (0.1378)
Spline 1 -0.0570*** -0.0585*** -0.0476***
(0.0155) (0.0153) (0.0126)
Spline 2 0.0415** 0.0425** 0.0317**
(0.0173) (0.0173) (0.0148)
Spline 3 -0.0164 -0.0166 -0.0105
(0.0111) (0.0112) (0.0100)
Constant -1.8356*** -3.9191*** -7.3282***
(0.2936) (0.5498) (1.6407)









Table 2.  Semi-Parametric Spline Regressions: Internal Collective Violence 
    
Model 5 Model 6               
(Democracy 
subsample) 
Model 7                
(Language 
Subsample) 
S (Relative Group Size) 
    
    EDF 
 
1.923 2.367 1.836 
    χ2 
 
22.95 8.36 6.22 
     p  < 0.0001 0.019 0.034 
      
Deviance explained  21.5% 21.6% 18.1% 
N   4477 1556 754 
 
 
Note: Each model represents a semi-parametric version of Model 1, estimated on a different subsample of the data. 
The  χ2  statistic tests the significance of the smooth of Relative Group Size, compared to the null hypothesis of no 
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Figure 3.  Probability of Internal Conflict:  
  Parametric versus Semi-Parametric Regression 
 
 
Note: Black solid line shows predicted probabilities derived from Model 1.  Gray solid lines show standard errors 
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Figure 4.  Probability of Internal Conflict:  
  Distinct Language vs. Democratic Constraints 
 
 
Note: Predicted probabilities based on Models 5, 6, and 7.  The solid line shows results from Model 5 (full sample), 
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1
 An important exception is recent work by Cunningham (2011) and Cunningham, Bakke, and Seymour (2012), 
which uses a random sample of 22 separatist ethnic groups to examine the consequences of intra-group divisions. 
2
 For instance, Gorenburg (2000) uses survey data to demonstrate the existence of significant variations in 
nationalist sentiments within ethnic minority groups in the Russian Federation. 
3
 See Duffy and Lindstrom (2002), Azam (2001), and Bahry et al. (2005) for discussions of the "solidary" incentives 
such organizations provide for membership. 
4
 See Liljaa & Lisa Hultman (2011) for an analysis of such dynamics in the Sri Lankan Civil War, and Fotini (2008) 
for an examination of violence within the Bosnian Muslim community. 
5
 Notable exceptions are the examinations of in-group policing by Fearon and Laitin (1996) and Bhavnani and 
Miodownik (2008). 
6
 In the following section, we relax this assumption by examining circumstances under which states would have an 
incentive to promote factional violence rather than suppressing it. 
7
 Wilkinson's (2004) analysis shows that states can behave quite strategically in this regard, allowing some conflicts 
to boil over while actively suppressing others, depending on political context. 
8
 This conjecture is also supported by the sociological literature on perceptions of group threat, which consistently 
finds a positive relationship between the relative size of a group and the level of threat it is perceived to pose (King 
and Wheelock 2007; Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 2009). 
9
 The upper bound on group size, r < 0.5, is important here, as above this line our argumentation breaks down.  In 
particular, we argue that S '' (r) > 0 because the probability of the existence of another larger minority faction in the 
same country is decreasing in group size, but there is no reason to believe this relationship would hold for r > 0.5, 
where the probability of the existence of another larger minority is 0, and constant in group size.  This limitation is 
also key to the logic of the F curve, as it excludes the possibility of super-majority groups, which may face 
additional political incentives for shrinking or splitting that would not be well-captured by our model.  Our model 
thus makes no predictions concerning the conflict propensities of majority groups, as such groups lie outside the 
domain of the theory. 
10
 Note that the condition F ' (0)  >  S ' (0) simply eliminates the degenerate case in which external pressure exceeds 
internal pressure for all values of r.  Note also that it is not strictly necessary that F '' (r) < 0 and S '' (r) ≥ 0; as long 
as F '' (r) < S '' (r), the argument still holds.  
11
 For an examination of the peace-building consequences of rebel fragmentation, see Driscoll (2012). 
12
 The results are unchanged if we instead use the 'squared' + 'cubed' approach recommended by Carter and 
Signorino (2009). 
13
 We also conduct a number of robustness checks to ensure that this particular specification is not driving our 
results.  In particular, we tried modified versions of Model 3 with the addition of a lagged dependent variable, using 
the standard Polity2 index to measure democracy instead of XPolity, and the use of alternative severity thresholds 
for Rebellion.  In each instance, we find that the results are substantively equivalent to those reported here, and so 
we omit them in the interest of space.   
14
 For a discussion of the strengths and weakness associated with different approaches to the estimation of 
smoothing splines, see Hastie, Tibshirani and Friedman (2001). 
15
 The model is estimated using the mgcv package in R; see Wood (2001) for details.  For an interesting application 
of GCV to the study of international conflict, see Ramsey (2008). 
16
 Note that the precise level of this significance test should be taken with a grain of salt, as the  χ2  test underlying it 
is only approximate in the context of the generalized cross-validation approach used to select the smoothing 
parameter. 
